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Report On
TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
IN THE PORTLAND METROPOLITAN AREA
To the Board of Governors,
City Club of Portland:
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF STUDY
Compared to most other countries in the world today, and to histori-
cal standards, Americans benefit from a highly technological industrial
base.
As a responsible society we must be concerned about the possibility
of release of these hazardous materials from time of generation to perma-
nent disposal. We use products that are lighter, stronger, more elec-
tronically complex, less expensive, and more versatile than would have
been dreamed possible a century ago. In providing the benefits of high
technology, American firms rely upon and produce materials and byproducts
which are hazardous and which, if accidentally or intentionally released
into the environment, can wreak severe damage on human health and the
environment. This report is limited to a single aspect of this problem:
the safe transportation of hazardous materials within and through the
Portland metropolitan area. Specifically, your Committee was charged to:
describe the movement of hazardous materials in the Portland
area, and the manner in which this movement is regulated;
review and determine the extent of public danger due to
transportation of hazardous materials in the Portland area;
evaluate the adequacy of federal and state regulations and the
effectiveness of enforcement;
identify safety and precautionary measures that should be taken
to prevent accidental spills of hazardous materials during
transportation, and to respond to accidental spills when they
occur.
Even though the problem of hazardous waste disposal is extremely im-
portant, your Committee has not considered the subject. Instead, we have
concentrated our limited resources on the very complex topic of trans-
porting hazardous materials.
In reviewing the transportation of hazardous materials in the
Portland metropolitan area, we considered:
the risks to health and safety
the laws and regulations that have been enacted to protect the
public from release of these materials during transport
the enforcement of these laws and regulations
the measures that have been taken to prepare for emergencies
that result from the accidental release of hazardous materials
during transport.
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We have assessed the adequacy of actions that have been taken, and
have recommended additional measures we feel are cost effective in pro-
viding protection to the public.
II. BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS
^_ Definition of Hazardous Materials
For the purpose of this report, a "hazardous material" is a substance
which may pose an unreasonable risk to health and safety or property when
transported in commerce. Materials so designated may include, but are
not limited to, explosives, radioactive materials, etiologic (disease-
causing) agents, flammable liquids or solids, combustible liquids or
solids, poisons, oxydizing or corrosive materials and compressed gases*
(1).
B^ Nationwide Incidents and Problems
1L Overview
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has designated approxi-
mately 18,000 materials as hazardous, and the number grows each month as
new chemical substances are developed (2). More than 4 billion tons of
regulated hazardous materials move in commerce each year (about 250,000
shipments each day) (3,4).
These materials move on trucks, trains, airplanes, ships and
barges**. There have been accidental releases of hazardous materials in
each mode of shipment; materials from each category listed in our defini-
tion have been released at one time or another.
Fortunately the number of accidents resulting in major loss of life
is very small compared to the number of shipments made. But national
trends indicate a growing problem. The number of reported accidental
hazardous chemical spills grew from 2,256 in 1971 to 18,022 in 1978.
Reported annual fatalities grew from 23 to 46 (5).
2^ Reliability of National Statistics
These national figures may seriously understate the problem. The
Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) of the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation, which is responsible for collecting this information, relies upon
voluntary reporting by carriers. A study by the National Transportation
Safety Board finds that only about 1500 of the 168,000 known interstate
carriers have ever reported hazardous substance spills (6). A General
Accounting Office review of 30 major accidents reported by news media
found that only 12 of the incidents were reported to MTB by the carri-
ers. The 18 unreported accidents caused 18 deaths, 9 missing person re-
ports, at least 187 injuries, and unknown property damage (4).
* A flammable substance will catch fire when exposed to a flame at room
temperature. A combustible substance will catch fire when exposed to
flame only after the substance has been heated.
** Pipeline transmission, which is used for many hazardous materials, is
not considered in this report.
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The National Transportation Safety Board concludes that surprisingly
little is known about 1) the amounts of hazardous materials in transport,
2) their distribution among various modes of transportation, 3) the
routes on which they are being moved, 4) the number and types of shippers
and carriers involved in their handling, 5) the number of accidents in-
volving hazardous materials or their costs to society, 6) the risk to be
assessed in developing hazard control strategies, and 7) many other basic
questions (6).
3. Analysis of Accidents by Mode of Transportation
Despite the incompleteness of the data, we have examined the inci-
dents that have been reported to get some idea of where risks appear to
be greatest. We have considered the number of incidents, injuries and
fatalities by substance being transported and by mode of transport.
Figure 1 shows the distribution by mode of transportation of hazar-
dous materials spills reported to the Materials Transportation Bureau be-
tween 1971 and 1980. Most spills occurred on the highway, rail incidents
were a distant second and all other modes were far behind (7).
Rail 8 %
Air 1 %
Water 1 %
Highway 9 1 %
Number of Incidents Reported
by Mode of Transportation
1971-1980
Figure 1
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Rail transportation of hazardous materials is a more serious problem
when fatalities are considered. Figure 2 shows that of the 241 hazardous
materials-related deaths reported in the 1971-1980 period, 80 percent
were in highway accidents and 18 percent in rail accidents. Rail acci-
dents are less frequent but tend to be more serious and to involve larger
quantities of materials when they occur. Deaths resulting from air and
water transport spills were 2 percent and 1 percent respectively.
Rail 18%
Air 2%
Water less than 1%
Highway 80%
Number of Fatalities Reported
by Mode of Transportation
1971-1980
Figure 2
The more serious nature of rail incidents, when they occur, is fur-
ther confirmed by reviewing distribution of the reported injuries
(Figure 3). The largest number of injuries results from highway acci-
dents, with 64 percent of the total. Rail transport incidents caused 32
percent, or half the number resulting from highway transport.
Rail 32%
Air 1%
Water 1%
Other 1%
Highway 64%
Number of Injuries Reported
by Mode of Transportation
1971-1980
Figure 3
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Figure 4 shows the distribution by property damage. Rail accidents
continue to grow in relative importance, though highway accidents still
account for more than half the total.
Rail 3 9 %
Air 4 %
Water 1 %
Highway 5 5 %
Property Damage from Reported Incidents
by Mode of Transportation
1971-1980
Figure k
These data provide strong evidence that by any measure selected, the
transportation of hazardous materials by trucks should be a primary area
of concern. We will examine in detail some of the reasons for this later
in the report. Rail accidents, while fewer, have a high impact in inju-
ries, fatalities and property damage. Rail transportation must also be
given high priority for any study of hazardous materials transportation
safety.
Air, water and pipeline shipments of hazardous materials have also
resulted in serious accidents and tragic deaths, and cannot be overlooked
by transportation safety regulators or disaster planners. Nonetheless,
because your Committee has limited time and resources we have chosen to
concentrate our attention on truck and rail transport where deaths, inju-
ries and property damage are many times greater.
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4. Analysis of Accidents by Nature of Cargo
Turning to specific hazardous materials, gasoline and liquefied pe-
troleum gas (LPG) accounted for nearly two-thirds of the fatalities re-
ported in the 1971-1978 period (see Figure 5). A lower but significant
proportion of the total deaths resulted from accidents in which chlorine,
corrosive liquids, and anhydrous ammonia were the cargo (8).
Chlorine 9%
Liquified
Petroleum
Gas 26.1%
Corrosive Liquids 6.6%
Anhydrous Ammonia 6.2%
Acids 3.3%
Crude Oil 2.1%
Other 7.2%
Gasoline 38.9%
Fatalities in Transportation Accidents
by Material Involved
(All Modes)
1971-1978
Figure 5
Many of the public sector witnesses appearing before your Committee
agreed that public attention has tended to focus on shipment of the esti-
mated 2.5 million containers of high and low-level radioactive materials
that are moved annually by all modes of transportation (2). For the pe-
riod reported, less than one-half of one percent of the incidents in-
volved radioactive materials. These accidents involving radioactive ship-
ments caused only 2 of the 6,667 reported injuries and none of the re-
ported deaths.
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5^_ Examples of Major Incidents
Accident statistics give no sense of the destruction that can result
from a major chemical transportation incident, or the impact the incident
can have on the lives of residents in the community where an incident oc-
curs, even if the accident is eventually brought under control without
injury or death. Evacuations, concern about human life and property, and
uncertainty about the future cause serious public anxiety whenever a ma-
jor incident occurs.
The following items demonstrate the tremendous damage such accidents
can cause:
Two days following a 1978 24-car derailment in Waverly.
Tennessee, a tank car filled with liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
exploded during cleanup operations. Sixteen policemen and fire-
men were killed, including the chiefs of both departments, and
43 were injured.
In 1978 a train derailed near Youngstown, Florida carrying
chlorine, LPG, oil, caustic soda, and other hazardous mater-
ials. Chlorine escaping from a punctured tank car killed eight
people, injured 138 and caused over $1 million in damage. Had
the wreck occurred nearer the city, the casualties could have
been far worse.
Closer to home, a 1959 explosion of a dynamite truck in
Roseburg, Oregon killed 14, injured 125 and destroyed 14 city
blocks, causing over $12 million in damage (9, 10).
In 1979 a train derailment in Mississauga, Ontario—a Toronto
suburb—occurred near midnight on a weekend. Shortly after the
accident, a tank car of LPG exploded and was thrown over 700
yards. A tank car leaking chlorine came to rest against two
tank cars of propane which were in danger of exploding. Over
240,000 people were evacuated for 6 days until the situation was
brought under control.
C. Characteristics of Hazardous Materials Transportation
in the Portland Area
jL^  Hazardous Materials Transported
Federal and state regulations governing the transportation of non-
radioactive hazardous materials classify them into four general cate-
gories: flammable, combustible, corrosive and poison. Examples of mater-
ials in each category that are transported within the Portland metropoli-
tan area include the following:
Flammable: gasoline, toluene, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG),
acetone, varnish, paints, alcohol
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Combustible: fuel oil, machinery oils, grease, asphalt products,
plastics, resin, organic dyes, oil defoamer
Corrosive: hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, chromic acid, nitric
acid, hydrofluoric acid, caustic soda, lime, phenol
Poison: pesticides, chlorine, anhydrous ammonia, wood preserv-
atives, arsenic, paint pigments
Virtually every type of industry in the area uses hazardous materials
in its routine production processes. Most of these materials are trans-
ported in liquid form.
Statistics are not readily available on the transportation patterns
of individual materials. Considerable information is available, however,
on the totals moving in each major category. Table 1 shows, for example,
an estimate of the total gallons of materials hauled within Multnomah
County in 1979 (11):
Table 1
1979 TRANSPORT OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY
Category
Flammable
Combustible
Poison
Corrosive
Gallons
142,635,000
48,990,000
9,740,000
8,795,000
Percentage
67.9%
23.3%
4.6%
4.2%
These figures emphasize the relative risk posed by flammables and
combustibles. Movements of gasoline, oil and asphalt account for over 90
percent of all truck shipments of hazardous materials.
Approximately 400 barrels of low-level nuclear wastes are generated
each year at the Trojan nuclear plant and shipped through Portland for
disposal at Hanford (11). Witnesses having medical, regulatory and
transportation expertise agreed that neither these nor the low-level
radioactive chemicals transported to and from Portland area medical
institutions appear to pose a major public risk. This viewpoint was
confirmed by the Multnomah County risk analysis (11).
Trojan also generates an estimated 30 tons of high-level nuclear
wastes from spent fuel each year. Currently this is being stored at the
plant site pending a federal solution to the problem of permanent dispo-
sal. If the problem is solved, that waste may be shipped through the
metropolitan area. When that material is shipped, its transport will
merit careful attention by regulators and public safety agencies.
Etiologic (disease causing) agents are not transported in significant
quantities in the Portland metropolitan area (11).
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2^_ Transportation Modes and Patterns
Hazardous materials move in and through the metropolitan area by all
modes of transportation. Few air shipments occur. Those which do are
strictly regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration. Marine trans-
port of flammables and combustibles are sizeable, since a majority of the
area's petroleum products are brought in by tanker to privately owned
terminals along the Willamette River. These and other water shipments of
hazardous materials are regulated by the Coast Guard.
As is true nationally, most serious hazardous materials accidents in
the Portland area have involved truck or rail transport. Table 2 shows
estimates of movements by these two modes in Multnomah County in 1979
Table 2
SHIPMENTS OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY IN 1979
Hazard Hauled by Truck Hauled by Rail Total
Category Gallons Truckloads Gallons Carloads Gallons
Flammable 126,715,000 304,000 15,929,000 800 142,635,000
Combustible 47,730,000 114,000 1,260,000 60 48,990,000
Poison 3,960,000 9,500 5,780,000 290 9,740,000
Corrosive 4,775,000 11,500 4,020,000 200 8,795,000
TOTAL 183,180,000 439,000 26,980,000 1,350 210,160,000
Table 2 shows that more than 300 truckloads of hazardous chemicals
move in the County for every rail carload. The size of the average truck
shipment is 400 to 500 gallons; hazardous liquids move on rail in 20,000
gallon carloads. This suggests that there is likely to be a greater fre-
quency of accidents involving trucks, but a greater potential hazard as-
sociated with an individual accident involving a railcar. Accident sta-
tistics bear this out.
Transportation patterns for hazardous materials can be divided into
external and intra-regional shipments.
External shipments are those from sources outside the region to local
industries, or shipments from Portland industries to customers outside
the region. Since the origin or destination of such trips is some local
industrial firm, the land transportation routes involved are the rail-
roads, freeways and major arterials linking Portland area industry to
other regions.
Intra-regional shipments, on the other hand, include not only rout-
ings between industries within the region but also between industrial
areas and_ local distribution points. For example, when gasoline, fuel
oil or paint is moved from terminals, manufacturers and warehousing oper-
ations to local retail outlets, the trucks drive on minor arterial
streets as well as on major arterials and freeways. Fuel oil is carried
on residential streets.
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3^_ Areas and Routes of Special Concern
Most hazardous material shipments move along freeways, arterials and
rail lines serving the region's industrial areas. Multnomah County's
Hazardous Materials Risk Analysis (11) defined the following "key hazard
areas" and "key hazard routes" on the basis of the intensity of hazardous
materials movements in and among them (see Figure 6):
Areas: Northwest industrial area
Columbia Boulevard
Inner Southeast industrial area
Routes: 1-5
1-405
1-84
N.W. Front Avenue
N.W. St. Helens Road
The northwest industrial area between Front Avenue and St. Helens
Road originates or receives between 50 and 90 percent of the shipments of
each category of hazardous materials in Multnomah County. The area and
the routes leading to and from it clearly merit special concern.
D. Federal Laws and Regulations
h. Relationship of Federal Law to State Law
Numerous federal and state laws have been enacted to govern transpor-
tation of hazardous materials. In general, because of the interstate
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal laws will preempt con-
flicting state laws. As a practical matter, agencies in Oregon follow
federal laws and regulations. Therefore, preemption is not an issue of
concern in this report.
2LL. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
Federal regulation of transportation of hazardous materials comes
under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1974. Under this
act, the U.S. Department of Transportation has issued comprehensive regu-
lations governing transportation of hazardous materials. In general, the
regulations establish minimum requirements for the following:
manufacture, qualifications, maintenance and use of containers
and transport vehicles
inspection of containers and transport vehicles
packaging of materials, labeling of containers and marking of
vehicles
methods for handling materials
notification of and reporting on spills and other incidents.
The federal regulations under the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act provide authority for systematic inspection of transport vehicles.
Vehicles found unsafe are grounded until they are repaired. The
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Department of Transportation and the Bureau of Explosives inspect rail
cars and highway carriers. Rail car inspections include not only the car
containing the hazardous chemicals, but also adjacent cars that may con-
tribute to a possible derailment or to the consequences if derailment oc-
curs. The Federal Aviation Administration inspects aircraft subject to
its jurisdiction, and the U.S. Coast Guard inspects vessels for compli-
ance with regulations.
3. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
In 1973 the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommended
passage of a law to regulate handling of hazardous waste. EPA reported
that existing laws were inadequate to control transportation and disposal
of waste on land.
In 1976 Congress responded with passage of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, which includes three basic components:
1) A "cradle-to-grave" control system to track all significant
quantities of hazardous waste from point of generation to point
of final disposal. This component includes:
identification of hazardous wastes
standards for generators and transporters of hazardous
wastes
performance, design and operating requirements for facili-
ties that treat, destroy or dispose of hazardous wastes
a system for issuing permits for such facilities
guidelines describing conditions under which state govern-
ments can be authorized to carry out their own hazardous
waste management programs in lieu of a federal program
2) Identification of dump sites
3) Creation of a fund to allow governments to respond to trouble-
some disposal sites, and spills of hazardous materials.
Regulations issued by EPA under The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act require a transporter of hazardous waste to:
Obtain an EPA identification number
Comply with a manifest system to track the waste
Deliver the entire quantity of waste to the designated site
Retain records for three years
Report and clean up discharges and spills
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act gives each state the op-
tion to develop its own programs, including the minimum requirements
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listed above, for the management and control of hazardous waste. Oregon
has done so, as will be discussed in the next section.
_4j_ Other Federal Regulation of Hazardous Materials Transportation
In addition to the two major statutes described above, other federal
laws and regulations are directed to more specific aspects of hazardous
chemical transportation. Table 3 lists federal agencies your Committee
found were involved in preventing or responding to hazardous chemical ac-
cidents.
Table 3
FEDERAL AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION
OR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ACCIDENTS
Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
U.S. Coast Guard
Federal Highway Administration
Federal Railroad Administration
Office of Pipeline Safety
National Transportation Safety Board
Materials Transportation Bureau
Environmental Protection Agency
Department of Health and Welfare
National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Department of the Treasury
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Food and Drug Administration
Department of Defense
Department of Agriculture
Department of Interior
Federal Emergency Management Administration
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration
E. State of Oregon Laws and Regulations
1^_ Public Utility Commission
The Public Utility Commissioner (PUC) of Oregon holds primary author-
ity for regulation of motor, rail and air carriers in the state. The PUC
is responsible for setting rules and regulations controlling the trans-
portation of hazardous materials. These responsibilities include (1)
safety compliance surveys, (2) highway vehicle inspection and (3)
accident investigations. In its rulemaking, the PUC has chosen to pro-
vide uniformity and to avoid confusion between state and federal rules by
adopting the regulations in force at the federal level.
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The PUC requires railroads to determine, for each milepost along
their lines in Oregon, the local emergency response agencies having ju-
risdiction at that point. The resulting lists are provided to railroad
dispatchers, to PUC staff, and to the State Emergency Services Office.
This action was taken to reduce the time required to identify and notify
the appropriate local agencies if an emergency occurs.
2^ Department of Environmental Quality
The PUC shares authority over transportation of hazardous materials
with a number of other state agencies. The Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) is charged with supervising and coordinating all state
agencies in hazardous waste disposal, but has no authority over hazardous
chemicals used as raw or intermediate materials, or as fuels. A shipment
of acetone to be used for cleaning metals is free from DEQ regulation on
the trip to the plant, but the used solvent comes under DEQ authority on
the trip from the plant to its disposal.
The DEQ also requires prompt and safe cleanup of any hazardous mater-
ials spilled. Under Oregon law, the party who has physical custody of
the hazardous material is responsible for the cleanup. There are private
firms in the area who specialize in containing and cleaning up chemical
spills. Unless the shipper or carrier can handle the problem unassisted,
one of these firms is usually hired to do the job. If this is not done,
DEQ has statutory authority to contract for the cleanup and to seek reim-
bursement from the responsible party through the Circuit Court. To date
this authority has never proved necessary; companies responsible for
spills have acted quickly and responsibly.
The DEQ administers Oregon's program of notifying local governments
of shipments of hazardous materials through their jurisdiction, to pro-
vide information for public safety planners. In Oregon this notification
is provided by after-the-fact reporting of what has been shipped, rather
than notification of shipments before they are made. For a brief time
North Carolina required firms to notify regulators before shipments and
quickly abandoned the requirement. After only three weeks of operation
government officials were one week behind in reviewing the notices re-
ceived.
The permit program currently in use and administered by DEQ requires
the identification by manifest, termed "shipping paper", of hazardous
waste by each generator. The manifest, which is kept in the truck cab or
train caboose, contains the following:
Name and signature of generator
Name and signature of transporter
Name and signature of operator at disposal or treatment site
Type of material in specific terms
Quantity of material
Basic instructions in the event of an accident.
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Completion of the manifest is based on the honor system, though vio-
lations are punishable by a fine of up to $3,000, one year in jail, or
both. DEQ requires a quarterly report from each generator, but most
firms send a copy to DEQ at the time of preparation of the manifest.
The Public Utility Commissioner is required to consult with and con-
sider the recommendations of DEQ when adopting rules controlling the
transportation of hazardous waste.
Zj_ Other State Agencies
Next to the Public Utility Commissioner, the Workers' Compensation
Board has the broadest statutory authority relating to hazardous mater-
ials transportation. Workers' Compensation laws, however, are limited to
protecting the health and safety of employees, rather than public safe-
ty. In protecting employees, the Board may enforce the rules or stand-
ards set by other state agencies. The Board may also conduct vehicle in-
spections, but only after a complaint has been filed.
The State Fire Marshal, in the Department of Commerce, also has a ma-
jor role in the transportation of hazardous materials, especially flam-
mable, combustible and explosive cargoes. Statutes authorize the State
Fire Marshall to set and enforce standards for the design and operation
of equipment for handling and transporting liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG). He is also charged with licensing drivers who transport LPG and
with inspecting transport and storage tanks. Fines for violating these
regulations may be up to $200, 6 months in jail, or both.
The Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Transportation re-
quires companies to keep records of shipments of vehicle fuel. The
trucks that carry vehicle fuel must carry emergency flares, and their
drivers must follow rules set by the Motor Vehicle Division to protect
the public.
The Oregon Department of Agriculture has adopted regulations covering
the transport of restricted use pesticides and of highly toxic pesti-
cides. The Department enforces registration of pesticides and applica-
tors, sets labeling requirements and licenses consultants, dealers, oper-
ators and applicators. All commercial applicators are required to know
proper transportation methods. Fines for violation of these state laws
and regulations may be up to $1,000 ($2,000 for a second violation), one
year in jail, or both.
The Energy Facility Siting Council, Oregon Department of Energy, reg-
ulates thermal and nuclear power generating plants. This includes the
transportation of nuclear fuels to plants and of wastes from the plants.
Fines for violation of state laws and regulations for nuclear fuel trans-
port may be up to $25,000 for each day of violation. When setting rules,
the Council is required to consider the rules and regulations of the
Federal Department of Transportation. This also avoids conflict with the
Oregon PUC, since the latter has adopted the federal regulations at the
state level.
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The Health Division of the Department of Human Resources has estab-
lished rules to protect the public in case of radiation accidents. Each
carrier who transports or intends to transport radioactive material, must
submit and maintain an emergency response plan in the event of an acci-
dent.
The 1981 Legislature increased maximum fines for infractions of the
laws and regulations relating to transportation of hazardous wastes to
$10,000 per day per infraction, and also set criminal penalties for vio-
lation of certain provisions.
ju_ Local Government Regulations
For the most part local governments in the metropolitan area have
left the regulation of hazardous materials transportation to federal and
state authorities, and have concentrated their efforts on enforcement and
emergency response.
Fj_ Enforcement of Laws and Regulations
The above text lists a tremendous number of federal and state agen-
cies responsible for different aspects of rulemaking relating to hazard-
ous materials transportation. However, since federal and state laws give
primary responsibility to a small number of agencies, the regulatory pic-
ture is not quite as complicated as it might appear.
Enforcement is also highly fragmented. Coupled with severe local,
state and federal budget constraints, such fragmentation makes it
extremely difficult to obtain reliable measures of enforcement staffing
levels. The following personnel levels were in force at the time agen-
cies were contacted by Committee members but may not necessarily reflect
the situation in the near future.
j^_ Federal Agencies
The U.S. Department of Transportation enforces trucking regulations
through the Motor Carrier Safety Section of the Federal Highway Adminis-
tration, and enforces rail regulations through the Federal Railroad
Administration. The former agency provides two or three inspectors who
cover all of Oregon, in theory responsible for enforcing all aspects of
trucking laws. In fact, they have little time for truck inspections and
they provide no on-road inspections. The rail agency has two employees
who focus on rail car inspections and must cover Oregon and parts of
Washington, Idaho and Wyoming. Three other FRA inspectors review
regional equipment, crossings and other aspects of system safety.
The Bureau of Explosives, a private agency that is part of the
American Association of Railroads, provides safety compliance audits for
chemical firms and all U.S. railroads. One employee, who covers Oregon,
Washington, Idaho and Montana, inspects Portland rail yards two or three
times each year.
2j_ State Agencies
At the state level, six Public Utility Commission vehicle inspectors
provide full safety inspections and audits at truck terminals, but very
few on-road inspections. These inspectors must cover the state, with the
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Portland area receiving approximately one full-time equivalent. PUC rail
enforcement personnel include three safety inspectors who work full time
with railroads on worker safety training, two equipment safety inspec-
tors, two track safety specialists and one official working to assure
that fire districts receive complete and accurate information about ship-
ments.
The PUC recently certified weighmasters from the Oregon Department of
Transportation to conduct full truck inspections at weigh stations. Two
inspectors cover 11 counties around Portland with ten permanent and two
portable scales. They inspect an average of about eight trucks per day
in the metropolitan area.
The State Fire Marshall has 13 deputies who inspect trucks hauling
propane and other gaseous fuels, and all propane-driven vehicles.
State Police, trained by PUC, provide highway enforcement by focusing
on "moving violations". They are responsible for enforcement along 7,000
miles of state highways and must enforce compliance of highway regula-
tions by drivers of automobiles and trucks carrying non-hazardous cargo
as well as truck drivers hauling hazardous chemicals.
The 1981 legislative session reduced the State Police budget by $4
million, which resulted in a 17 percent cut in the number of state troop-
ers. At the time of this writing (after Governor Atiyeh's calling a spe-
cial legislative session but before its convening) a further 20 percent
budget cut is being considered for all state agencies, including the
state police.
Of more direct impact upon the safety of hazardous materials trans-
portation is the recent elimination of a truck inspection program ini-
tiated in 1980.
The Oregon Senate Interim Committee on Transportation found in 1980
that the rates of truck inspection are lower in Oregon than in adjoining
states, a conclusion confirmed by many of our witnesses.
2^ Local Government Enforcement
Multnomah County is unique among area local governments in having one
Sheriff's deputy assigned full-time to safety inspections of trucks car-
rying hazardous materials. These inspections concentrate on trucks mov-
ing on freeways, to offset the State Police reduction of freeway enforce-
ment in the county. The officer responsible reports he inspects an aver-
age of 10 trucks per day. The county also has a deputy responsible for
over-dimensional and weight-mile violations for all trucks.
The City of Portland Police Bureau has assigned one officer to con-
duct PUC permit and weight-mile inspections within the City.
In addition, many area fire marshalls work with firms to reduce risks
by improving procedures for storage, use and transportation of flammable
and combustible materials.
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k^_ Training of Personnel
The legal, public safety, environmental and emergency response as-
pects of hazardous materials transportation are technical and complex.
Training programs should be and are available for shippers, carriers,
emergency response personnel and enforcement officers.
Presently available training programs include:
The National Fire Protection Association, the Operators Council
of the American Trucking Association, the Task Force of Rail
Transportation of Hazardous Materials, the U.S. Department of
Transportation, and many other public and private national
groups and agencies conduct training programs on aspects of
hazardous materials transportation. The DOT publishes a list of
educational institutions, corporations, businesses and
government agencies which provide training programs.
The Oregon PUC holds classroom instruction and on-the-road prac-
tice for State Police, weighmasters, Portland Police and Sher-
iff's deputies in Multnomah, Clackamas and Washington counties.
Instruction includes enforcement of PUC regulations and covers
equipment defects, shipping papers, permits, drivers work logs
and medical papers.
The Oregon Trucking Associations provides driver education pro-
grams which teach drivers the regulations, how the regulations
apply to drivers, and the penalties for non-compliance.
Multnomah County conducts mini-courses on the chemistry of
hazardous materials and response strategies for hazardous mater-
ials. Plans for the future include courses on advanced tac-
tics. To date 50 public safety personnel from Oregon and
Washington have been through the training programs.
Southern Pacific Railroad initiated, and other major railroads
are beginning to provide, training programs for fire fighters
and emergency service workers from communities in its service
area. The sessions are also available to employees of the U.S.
Forest Service, state and local police and county emergency
service officers.
G. Emergency Response
In the Portland metropolitan area primary responsibility for re-
sponding to an accidental spill of hazardous chemicals is shared by local
police and fire departments and the U.S. Coast Guard. If the incident is
major, emergency medical services and state and federal agencies may be
called upon to assist. The specific nature of the response will depend
on the nature of the incident.
Even identical incidents that occur in different jurisdictions may be
treated differently, depending on local planning, capabilities and dele-
gation of responsibilities. The major functions to be performed are as
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follows:
The initial responder to the call for help must assess the situ-
ation and determine the type of response appropriate. The
individual must decide the nature of response needed and whether
it can be provided with local resources or whether regional,
state or federal help is needed. Usually a policeman or fire
fighting official will make this determination.
Information must be obtained about the nature of the hazardous
material and about the type of response that is appropriate.
Federal regulations require vehicles to carry placards that
identify the materials and indicate the major dangers at a
glance, but reference materials are required to decode the
placards. An appropriate response in one instance (use of water
to extinguish a fire, for example) may only complicate the inci-
dent in another.
An immediate danger zone must be designated. Traffic control,
including barricades and detours, must be established. Right of
way must be provided for emergency vehicles. A decision must be
made whether the incident calls for evacuation, and, if so, the
extent of the area to be evacuated.
A chain of command must be established. If the incident in-
volves only local agencies, this is a matter of routine. If the
incident is major and involves many agencies working together
for the first time, it may be a major problem and consume con-
siderable time.
A strategy must be adopted for containing and controlling the
resulting fire or escape of poisonous or corrosive materials.
For major incidents the best strategy is sometimes to keep
everybody, including emergency personnel, out of harm's way
until the situation stabilizes.
If medical assistance is needed, another decision about level of
response must be made. The 911 emergency telephone system is
available to coordinate the medical services available from
local hospitals and ambulance services.
The most important response agency, and the one with primary respon-
sibility for public safety in most incidents, is the local fire depart-
ment. Firefighters are supported by and work closely with the local
police department. In the City of Portland and Multnomah County further
specialized assistance, expertise and coordination are available from a
local Office of Emergency Services.
Working with police and fire team members, the Emergency Medical
Services liaison officer designates four areas for medical action:
The immediate danger zone, where there is potential danger to
life. Casualties are removed from this area as quickly as pos-
sible, and only critical life support measures are performed.
The triage area, where casualities are assessed for priority of
treatment and transportation.
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The ambulatory area, where mobile victims are directed from the
triage area for additional assessment and treatment.
The ambulance holding area where arriving ambulances are held
until needed.
The EMS liaison officer also activates and monitors a radio communi-
cations system based at Providence Hospital, and, if necessary, requests
that a physician be called to the scene.
The chemical industry provides important resources for disaster re-
sponse. The Chemical Manufacturer's Association operates CHEMTREC (Chem-
ical Transportation Emergency Center), an emergency telephone service
that provides advice for those at the scene of emergencies and contacts
the shipper of the chemicals involved in the accident for detailed as-
sistance and follow-up. The Chlorine Institute, made up of producers of
chlorine gas, operates an emergency assistance service called CHLOREP,
while producers of deadly hydrogen cyanide offer the HCN system. These
industry groups offer special equipment and expertise, and will provide
advice by telephone until representatives can travel to the scene and
provide direct help in protecting life and property and in cleanup. In
addition many individual chemical manufacturing firms provide response
teams for specific chemical emergencies involving their products.
The Red Cross, Salvation Army, and many other private organizations
provide an important source of help when large numbers of people must be
evacuated, relocated, and provided shelter and food. These resources
should be part of any major disaster plan.
Emergency assistance from Oregon state agencies are coordinated by
the Oregon Accident Response System, which has prepared and adopted a
comprehensive emergency response plan. OARS has organized state agencies
to be able to respond to emergencies and disasters, including hazardous
chemical spills, and has published a reference manual that details im-
portant emergency contacts and procedures.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is an umbrella federal
agency that coordinates other federal agencies and helps state and local
agencies in planning, research, training and recovery efforts. Its ap-
proach, both in planning and in emergency response, is to supplement lo-
cal activities rather than supplant them.
The U.S. Coast Guard responds to "common body of water" spills where
rivers, lakes or other waterways are contaminated. When the spill is
from water transportation the Coast Guard is the primary emergency agen-
cy, with powers that combine some of those of both police and fire de-
partments. Coast Guard personnel call for outside assistance as needed.
The Coast Guard can levy fines against violators and conduct random in-
spections of vessels for compliance with applicable regulations. The
Coast Guard reports all violations and incidents to DEQ.
When a major incident occurs, many other individuals, firms and agen-
cies become involved. As an example, a rail incident that was quickly
contained in April 1981 involved the following (in order of notification)
(12): the transporter, the chemical company receiving shipment, the
Oregon Emergency Services Division, the Portland Fire Bureau, DEQ, the
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Emergency Response Coordinator of the chemical company originating
shipment, the Portland Office of Emergency Services, the State Fire
Marshall, the State Health Division (Emergency Medical Section), the
Multnomah County Office of Emergency Management, Fire District 10
Hazardous Materials Reponse Unit, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the Oregon Governor's Office, the Portland Police Bureau, the
Portland Waste Water Treatment Facility, City of Portland Sanitary Engi-
neering, a private contractor cleanup firm, U.S. Coast Guard National
Response Center, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Officer, and the Hospital
Emergency Administrative Radio system. Some of these in turn informed
others (the Coast Guard, for example, notified 18 other firms, agencies
or associations not included in this list). Had the incident not been
contained, many others would have been involved in the response.
1^ Special Readiness Efforts
In 1980 Multnomah County was awarded a grant from the Federal
Emergency Management Agency for a special demonstration project including
the following projects:
A risk analysis to identify areas in the county where hazardous
materials are manufactured, stored, distributed or sold* (11).
A hazardous materials incident prevention program, with legal
enforcement, industrial relations, and public relations compo-
nents similar to those for fire prevention programs.
An information retrieval system, including a reporting system
for tracking incidents that have occurred in Multnomah County, a
reference library of 90 books and pamphlets about hazardous
materials and their properties and handling, and a computerized
information retrieval system which can tap local and national
data bases for information about hazardous materials and their
handling.
An inventory of the resources available to the county for
dealing with hazardous materials incidents, considering both
internal and external sources of assistance.
Purchase of special vehicles and equipment to respond to
emergency spills of hazardous materials. These include a
station wagon with basic emergency response equipment, and a van
that can serve as an emergency command center and source of spe-
cial equipment. The van has a mobile telephone, police/fire
radio contact, special protective garments, and special equip-
ment including an infrared viewer, radiological monitoring
equipment, devices to identify vapors and explosive mixtures of
gases, fire extinguishers and first aid equipment, and regular
and non-sparking tools.
A training program offering minicourses in the chemistry of
* Much of the data on the transportation of hazardous materials in the
metropolitan area cited in this report came from the County's risk analy-
sis project.
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hazardous materials and response strategies for hazardous mater-
ials incidents.
A "how to" manual explaining to other jurisdictions how to set
up similar efforts.
The City of Portland has been awarded a supplemental contract to val-
idate the data collected in the County project, to prepare a hazardous
materials response program for the City that is tied into the County ef-
fort, and to build on the information made available by the County pro-
ject.
It is important to note that both the County and City programs were
made possible by a federal grant. Current and future efforts to reduce
federal spending may limit the availability of such grants to Portland
area jurisdictions.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Benefits and Risks of Hazardous Chemicals
We come into daily contact with hazardous materials and with products
made from hazardous materials. Review of the statistics cited earlier
shows that anyone who drives an automobile (or rides in alternative forms
of motorized transportation) is within a few feet of the most dangerous
chemical transported, if danger is measured by the proportion of injuries
or deaths. Most of us have, at one time or another, seen gasoline catch
fire, and few have failed to be impressed at the sight. Committee mem-
bers have not witnessed the proportionately greater power of a gasoline
tanker truck fire, but some members saw a film of a rail tank car car-
rying LPG as it exploded. The power, destruction and danger of the ex-
plosion were awesome.
Those who live in or visit homes heated by fuel oil or natural gas
are exposed to another form of hazardous materials. The alternative,
electric home heat, requires central electric generating plants, which
use or produce huge amounts of hazardous materials.
We view secondary and tertiary water treatment as environmentally
sound and socially desirable. Yet the process requires ammonia, chlo-
rine, chloride of lime, hydrogen sulfide and phosphoric acid, among other
chemicals on DOT's list of hazardous materials.
The manufacture of common paint requires large quantities of hazard-
ous materials, including aluminum componds, ammonia, benzene, carbon di-
sulfide, chlorinated diphenyls and naphthalenes, ethyl silicate, diethy-
lene ether (dioxane), ketones, mercury compounds, methanol, phenol, sul-
furic acid, tetrachloroethane, toluene, trichloroethylene, turpentine and
xylene.
Electronics, long considered the prototype "clean" industry, uses
very large quantities of solvents, acids, luminescent components for ca-
thode ray tubes, and other hazardous chemicals.
Even the simple process of making soap requires lye as a raw material.
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And even relatively harmless chemicals can be hazardous in the bulk
quantities used for transport. Portland's most serious recent hazardous
chemicals incident, which some feel had the potential for an explosion
that could have destroyed the Steel Bridge, was caused by. ignition of a
ruptured tank car containing methanol (wood alcohol).
We may reduce dependence on hazardous chemicals, we may identify and
require procedures to improve safety of chemical transportation, we may
prepare to respond when accidents occur, but it would not be feasible to
eliminate the use of hazardous chemicals.
There are no easy or absolute answers about how best to strike a bal-
ance. We must rely on elected officials, regulatory administrators, bus-
iness leaders, and many private and public sector employees to assess
risks and to identify and implement appropriate actions. This must in-
clude an intelligent evaluation of cost and benefit. Where possible,
costs of prevention and public protection should be reflected in consumer
and industrial product prices.
,1^ Classification of Incidents by Degree of Risk
Much of our discussion will benefit from the following classification
of hazardous materials incidents:
Normal incidents: These are simple and relatively localized in-
cidents that threaten operators of the vehicles involved in the
accident and a limited number of bystanders who happen to be
near the accident scene. The incident can be contained using
normal fire fighting or chemical containment procedures, with no
major risk to public safety officials. These incidents can be
handled by local fire departments. The overwhelming majority of
incidents fall into this category.
Major incidents: These are larger and more dangerous accidents.
They require special experience and equipment. Many of the
smaller fire departments in the region would be unable to re-
spond effectively, and would need help from neighboring juris-
dictions. While the fire fighting personnel responding to such
incidents face significant risks, the general public outside the
immediate area is not threatened. Portland has had two such in-
cidents in the past year, and has handled them successfully.
Potential or actual chemical disasters: These are incidents that
cannot be contained by local resources, including those called
in from neighboring jurisdictions. Large populations are at
risk, and evacuations are required. In many cases the best
strategy is to isolate the area and let the worst of the de-
struction occur, rather than risk the lives of public safety
personnel.
2_. Special Categories of Hazardous Materials
Public attention has concentrated on two types of hazardous chemi-
cals: radioactive materials and chemical wastes.
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In both cases these materials pose risks to public safety beyond
transportation. As explained in the introduction, this Committee's at-
tention has been concentrated only on transportation risks.
Your Committee feels, however, that concerns about the safety of nu-
clear plant operations and about safe disposal of radioactive wastes has
led to a level of concern about their transportation that is out of pro-
portion to the risk that exists. All of the data this Committee has re-
viewed, and all of the witnesses it has questioned, support the view that
the public is exposed to far less risk from the transportation of radio-
active materials than from the transportation of chemicals. Disposal of
chemical wastes is a complex and difficult problem. But wastes are not
inherently more dangerous than other chemicals. They amount to ten
million tons generated each year, a very minor proportion of the four
billion tons of hazardous chemicals shipped in the United States each
year. (3,4,6)
B. Extent of Public Danger
Your Committee was requested, in its charge, to determine the extent
of public danger posed by the transportation of hazardous materials in
the Portland area. Because major accidents involving hazardous materials
are infrequent but have tremendous potential to cause death and injury,
this has proved a very difficult assignment.
An insurance actuary can calculate the probability of a disaster oc-
curing by estimating the total number of incidents that will occur na-
tionwide in a specified time and dividing this number by the number of
communities at risk. This is useful information to the insurance com-
pany, because it can be used to set premium rates.
For residents and officials of a single community, however, such in-
formation is much less helpful. In reality they will either experience a
disaster or they will not; they cannot know in advance which outcome will
occur. If disaster occurs, any reasonable amount spent for prevention or
preparation may appear—in hindsight—inadequate or poorly used. If none
occurs, there will be constant pressures to divert funds from preparation
for such incidents to more immediately obvious needs.
Consequently this risk assessment is divided into two parts. First
we review the actual record and assess a level of risk assuming that the
past portends the future. Then that assumption is put aside and a "worst
case" assessment follows which speculates on what might happen should an
exceptionally unfavorable combination of circumstances occur.
1. Perspective from the Historical Record
During the 4-year period 1976-1979 there were 38 truck accidents in
the metropolitan area involving hazardous materials other than household
fuel oil deliveries and local service station gasoline deliveries. Of
these, 23 (or 60 percent) involved flammable or combustible materials and
the balance involved materials reported as "unknown". About 60 percent
also occurred on the key hazard routes listed in the Multnomah County
study.
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We could find no reports of injuries or deaths a result of an acci-
dent involving rail, air or waterborne shipment of hazardous materials
within the area during this same period.
Injuries and fatalities from truck accidents involving hazardous ma-
terials have not been reported locally. Across Oregon, however, during
the period 1976-1979, truck accidents resulted in 27 fatalities and 385
injuries for each 1,000 accidents. These rates are far higher than those
reported in the U.S. Department of Transportation data base for hazardous
materials incidents. In view of the scathing General Accounting Office
review of the reliability of the DOT data base (4), your Committee ac-
cepts the state of Oregon information as more reliable.
Since the available information does not indicate how many of these
accidents involved vehicles carrying hazardous chemicals, we cannot esti-
mate local injury and death rates from chemical transportation accidents.
PUC studies do indicate that the majority of truck accidents that re-
sult in hazardous materials spills involve only the truck hauling the
hazardous cargo. Driver error is the most frequent cause. In view of
this it does not seem likely that injury or death is very many times more
likely if the cargo is a hazardous chemical.
For example, if hazardous chemical cargoes increase the risk of inju-
ry or death by a factor of 4, the 38 truck accidents in four years multi-
plied by 4 times the statewide injury and mortality rates would suggest
that 15 injuries and 1 death each year might be a reasonable expectation
for the metropolitan area. These rates would be increased or decreased
proportionately by the actual (but unknown) factor of increased risk for
chemical transportation accidents.
If these rates could be extrapolated into the future, there would be
little cause for concern. Public safety might better be served by using
available resources to address other problems with a greater mortality
rate.
2. Perspective from "Worst Case" Considerations
Unfortunately, a "worst case" review of a number of recent incidents
does not suggest that we can safely assume that the historical rate will
continue into the future. A single major derailment involving tank cars
of highly flammable or toxic materials, under conditions that have ac-
tually occurred in other communities, could by itself raise these rates
by a factor of hundreds. One "worse case" national study indicates that
an accident involving rupture of only one tank car of chlorine could, if
it occurred in the worst possible location and during unfavorable wind
condition, kill up to 18,000 people (4).
While the Portland area has experienced a number of accidents that
fit the description of "normal incidents" (see Section III.A.I), there
have been only two recent "major incidents", both within the past year.
Neither resulted in injuries or fatalities. Consequently all the above
projections have been from normal incidents.
On April 21, 1981, an open valve was discovered on a tank car of
ethyleneamine located at the 3900 block of N.W. Yeon Street by the
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Portland Terminal Railroad. In the subsequent response and cleanup ac-
tion, which involved 20 local, state, and federal agencies, garbled com-
munications led temporarily to the belief that the chemical, relatively
harmless, was actually ethyleneimene, an extremely poisonous and easily
vaporized substance (12). Had this been the case, standard procedures
would have required evacuation of a strip downwind from the incident 1.4
miles wide and 2.2 miles long. A wind from the Northeast during such a
spill would have endangered much of Northwest Portland.
On October 5, 1980, a westbound train derailed under Portland's Steel
Bridge, setting fire to tank cars that were leaking methanol and poly-
vinyl chloride. No evacuation was required, and the Portland Fire Bureau
brought the fire under control. Had circumstances been highly unfavor-
able, a "boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion" (BLEVE) could have de-
stroyed the Steel Bridge. Such explosions have thrown portions of tank
cars more than half a mile from the scene.
A bit further from home, on February 29, 1980, a train collided with
a loaded gasoline truck just a few blocks from Seattle's Kingdome Stadium
as thousands of Sonics basketball fans were leaving the stadium. By good
fortune the 4,800 gallons of gasoline that spilled failed to catch fire.
That luck could just as easily have gone the other way. In Portland both
the Memorial Coliseum and the Civic Stadium are within a few blocks of
"key hazard routes" identified by the Multnomah County Study, with 1-5
and the mainline rail tracks within a few blocks of the Coliseum.
This information suggests that the risk to public safety from trans-
portation of hazardous chemicals in the Portland metropolitan area is
great enough to be taken seriously. Perhaps the risk compares in magni-
tude to risks from earthquake, major storms, floods, and other catastro-
phic events. The risk is not so great that citizens and public safety
officials should become unduly alarmed. Short term overreaction can be
as damaging as underreaction.
C. Evaluation of Effectiveness of Existing Public Protection
When the probability of a disaster is very low but the impact of the
disaster very high, as is the case with transportation of hazardous chem-
icals, it is difficult to answer the question, "How much protection is
enough?"
The question that defines the other side of our dilemma is being
asked more frequently: "How much protection can we prudently afford?"
When the American economy was healthy and on a seemingly unlimited growth
curve, this question seldom arose. Now that we face high unemployment,
high inflation and stagnant productivity, it is a growing concern.
Your Committee has not found definitive answers to these questions,
and so must rely on collective judgment rather than absolute standards.
This method was applied to each of the three types of public protection
from hazardous chemical incidents: 1) legislation and regulation, 2) en-
forcement, and 3) emergency response.
This section of the report briefly considers each of these areas and
addresses potential actions that might be taken for each.
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1^ Legislation and Regulations
None of the witnesses appearing before or contacted by your Committee
expressed a need for major changes in the federal laws and regulations
that govern hazardous materials transportation. They are voluminous and
detailed.
There also appears to be consistent effort to keep them updated. The
Federal Railroad Administration, for example, recently required rail tank
car owners to retrofit nearly 18,000 cars with shelf couplers. These de-
vices prevent cars from decoupling when vertical motion occurs. Free
couplers from the next car were estimated to be the most frequent cause
of rail car punctures upon derailment (13).
At the state level, the legislature has a history of concern about
hazardous chemical transportation and the Public Utility Commissioners
and their staffs have shown conscientious concern for public safety. The
PUC's strategy of adopting federal regulations at the state level im-
proves ease of compliance and enforcement without sacrificing public
safety.
Your Committee approached the question of state legislation and reg-
ulation by attempting to find a state that has enacted a "model" set of
rules that Oregon legislators could use as a base. The closest was the
"Tennessee Hazardous Waste Management Act", which consolidates all reg-
ulations and authorities regarding hazardous waste. The Act is enabling
legislation for the Tennessee Department of Public Health. The Depart-
ment is guided by the Act in determining rules and standards to which
producers and transporters of hazardous waste are held. Also, guidelines
are set for determining penalties for violations of these rules. The
powers and duties of those responsible are clearly defined in order to
prevent any conflicts.
Through this legislation the State of Tennessee appears to have de-
veloped a well organized, comprehensive plan for dealing with hazardous
waste. However, the Act does not address transportation of the many haz-
ardous chemicals that are not wastes. Nonetheless, while Oregon has not
appeared to suffer extensively from its present system of control, the
Tennessee approach of coordinating the transportation of hazardous mater-
ials through one authority, while cooperating with federal agencies, ap-
pears more efficient and may be better able to coordinate action in the
event of a disaster.
a. Personnel Training and Certification
Better personnel training and certification could result in a major
improvement in safe transportation of hazardous chemicals, particularly
in the railroad and trucking industries where most injuries and fatali-
ties occur. Presently there appears to be wide divergence in how well
train crews and truck drivers understand the hazards of the cargoes they
carry and what to do when an accidental spill occurs. Some chemical
firms have a policy of assuring that truck drivers know the nature of
their cargo and understand fundamental emergency procedures, but the
existence, duration and nature of such training vary from individual to
individual and from firm to firm.
The fundamental structural differences between Oregon's rail and
trucking industries must be recognized in designing any plan of action.
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Nearly all of Oregon's rail freight is moved by only three major national
firms. In contrast, there are an estimated 300,000 trucks domiciled in
Oregon, owned by an estimated 19,000 motor carrier firms. A very large
proportion of these are owner-operators with a single truck. These
owners struggle to operate in a climate of uncertainty over industry de-
regulation, high interest rates, rising fuel prices and reduced speed li-
mits.
PUC regulators and local fire departments can work directly with the
three railroads to promote personnel safety training and accident preven-
tion practices. When regulations are established PUC can rely on the
railroads' internal communications and control to assure that rail per-
sonnel are informed and held responsible by their employer for compliance.
In the trucking industry, however, regulators come into contact with
only a small proportion of the industry's decision makers. The small
size of most trucking firms and the tremendous volume of regulations make
communication of important decisions difficult, and complicate the pro-
cess of encouraging uniform levels of personnel training.
Because of public concerns about trucking safety, the Oregon Trucking
Associations is establishing a professional driver certification pro-
gram. The program will include standards, policies and procedures for
driver certification. Truck drivers will be encouraged to take a written
examination and road test. Those meeting the proposed standards will be-
come certified. Trucking companies and shippers will be encouraged to
hire certified drivers.
Presently the program is directed to the general issues of trucking
operations and safety. None of its planned standards will apply specifi-
cally to safe handling of hazardous cargoes.
With this foundation, it would not be difficult to expand the program
to provide certification and training in the transport of hazardous chem-
icals. Chemical industry representatives have indicated a willingness to
provide truck drivers with 3- or 4- hour training sessions that would in-
form them about specific hazardous materials and how to handle these ma-
terials in both normal and emergency conditions.
There are no assurances that the chemical and transportation indus-
tries can be relied upon to provide the needed training programs volun-
tarily, and to assure that individuals transporting dangerous chemicals
first receive training. It is in their long term self interest to do so;
failure to do so could bring increased government regulations that could
be more expensive and less efficient than self-regulation.
_b^ "Good Samaritan" Legislation for Chemical Firms
In a review of hazardous materials transportation policies for the
Puget Sound Region (14), local officials concluded there was a need for a
"Good Samaritan" law to protect chemical companies in the event of haz-
ardous chemical emergencies.
In many cases the nearest representative of a firm responsible for
producing a special chemical may be thousands of miles from the accident
scene. Yet a local firm may have an employee who is familiar with the
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chemical and with procedures for its containment and cleanup. Such an
expert may be reluctant to assist public safety agencies because to do so
may make him or his firm liable for some of the damages.
Firms could be protected from liability arising from actions taken in
connection with containment or cleanup while acting in good faith, with-
out compensation, under the appropriate jurisdictional authority. If
this were done, chemical firms could more prudently participate in public
efforts to contain and clean up hazardous chemicals spilled during trans-
port. Such participation could bring important additions to the equip-
ment and expertise available to deal with major incidents or disasters.
Cj_ Transportation Deregulation
None of the witnesses who appeared before your Committee or who were
interviewed by Committee members expressed concern about national trans-
portation deregulation having an impact on public safety. Several wit-
nesses said they believe that there would be little change in regulations
relating to the transportation of hazardous chemicals.
_cL_ Other Legislative Actions
Two other areas that require legislative attention at the state level
are the level of fines that are paid for violation of state safety regu-
lations and the number of personnel made available for enforcement ac-
tion. These topics are discussed below.
2. Enforcement
A number of studies indicate that an alarmingly high proportion of
trucks transporting hazardous chemicals have serious mechanical defects.
In one instance, approximately 20 percent of the vehicles inspected
during spot inspections were removed from service immediately.
According to the City of Portland's Hazardous Materials Hazard Analy-
sis (15), 44 percent of the trucks inspected are determined unsafe and
placed out of service, while the short-lived state police inspection took
48 percent of the trucks inspected off the road. (These proportions are
higher than the percentage of unsafe trucks in the spot check because in-
spectors select trucks that appear older and more poorly maintained.)
As mentioned earlier, 19,000 motor carrier firms operate in Oregon.
Many of these consist of an individual who owns and operates a single
truck. The owner is often near the limit of borrowing power, and has few
reserves to cope with unforeseen problems or economic recessions. Often
there may be insufficient funds even for adequate vehicle maintenance.
This problem is compounded because there are not enough law enforce-
ment personnel available to remove unsafe vehicles from the road. The
PUC estimates that only 20 percent of the trucks carrying hazardous chem-
icals are inspected each year. A review of the number of enforcement
personnel available leads one to question how the proportion of inspected
vehicles could be that high.
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A handful of officers is responsible for enforcing the federal, state
and local truck safety regulations: three safety investigators from the
U.S. Department of Transportation cover the state; six PUC vehicle safety
inspectors also have statewide responsibility.
The Oregon State Police have sharply curtailed highway patrols in the
three-county metropolitan area. The 1981 state budget cuts deleted near-
ly $4 million and 112 state police jobs which will, in the words of the
State Police Superintendent, "cripple" its trucking law enforcement pro-
gram, and more cuts appear pending. During the brief period when the
State Police truck inspection program was in effect, there was a 30 per-
cent reduction in the number of vehicles forced to use truck escape ramps
located along steep grades.
At the local level the picture is no more encouraging. Multnomah
County has assigned one officer full-time to inspect trucks carrying haz-
ardous materials. No other local government has done even that.
<L\ Penalties for Violations
There do not appear to be heavy financial pressures on trucking firms
to comply with safety regulations. While maximum fines for violations
run to thousands of dollars per violation, your Committee could find lit-
tle evidence that fines actually levied were anywhere near that amount.
None of the enforcement officers, regulators, legislators or court offi-
cers contacted by your Committee knew much in detail about levels of
fines levied for hazardous materials violations. A Committee member
seeking this information found that it could be obtained only by a manual
search of the disposed tags.
Enforcement officers indicated that the bail level set for a viola-
tion typically ranges from $50 to $350. In the absence of better infor-
mation, it is reasonable to assume that the fines actually levied are in
this order of magnitude.
The enforcement officers contacted said they believe that more com-
plete feedback about the disposition of their citations would help them
perform their job better. Your Committee also feels that more accessible
information about penalties for hazardous materials violations would help
legislators determine whether the legal penalties for violations are ap-
propriate. They would also deter violations, especially if the level of
fines assessed for major and negligent violations were closer to the
authorized limits.
Most large trucking firms recognize the long-term advantages of con-
tinuous vehicle maintenance, but many small firms find it preferable to
defer the immediate expense of keeping their trucks operating safely. An
immediate and severe economic penalty for negligent violations would help
remove the short-term incentive for neglecting maintenance.
The Multnomah County officer responsible for truck safety enforcement
told your Committee that he receives calls from hired truck drivers tel-
ling him their route and asking that he stop them for an inspection.
They know their trucks are unsafe and don't want to drive them. They
feel this is the best way to get the truck owners to make repairs.
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Your Committee is aware of the heavy burden that government regula-
tion places on small business owners and operators, and is reluctant to
recommend adding to that burden. However, the public has a right to ex-
pect that trucks operate safely, particularly when they carry a load of
dangerous chemicals.
Local and state enforcement could be greatly improved through two
simple steps: providing more full-time enforcement officers and levying
higher fines. After a few years, as compliance improves, the number of
officers assigned to this function could again be reduced. Three to six
additional officers in the region would be a major improvement. The num-
ber may seem very modest, but it would represent an increase of one to
two hundred percent.
A higher level of fine collections could partly offset the costs of
stricter enforcement and business license fees could be used to fund the
balance. These costs would be passed on to consumers of products made
from hazardous chemicals, assuring that the full costs are borne by the
ultimate users of the chemicals.
Your Committee received a suggestion that small truckers be prohi-
bited from transporting hazardous materials altogether. After discus-
sion, members agreed that this would be an unreasonable restraint of
trade. None of the preceding discussion implies that all small trucking
firms operate unsafe equipment. Some small firms who are willing and fi-
nancially able to meet strict safety standards may transport chemicals
more safely than firms with large fleets and hired drivers.
Your Committee also considered requiring all trucks carrying hazard-
ous chemicals to pass an annual mechanical safety inspection. This ap-
proach was not recommended for a number of reasons: 1) it would be much
more costly than improved on-road enforcement, 2) it would unnecessarily
increase costs for the many trucking companies that conscientiously main-
tain their equipment in safe operating order, 3) it would not be feasible
to require inspection of every truck moving through the area in the
course of long distance hauls, and 4) the PUC studies show driver error a
more common cause of accidents than equipment failure. For these reasons
improved on-road enforcement seems more cost effective.
3^ Emergency Response
In studies published by the Disaster Research Center at Ohio State
University (16, 17, 18), researchers found that for most metropolitan
areas in the United States, overall preparedness for chemical disasters
is generally either non-existent, poorly developed or merely a paper
plan. Responses to acute chemical disasters tend to be ad hoc, crude ef-
forts to apply general disaster plans.
The studies found that organizational conflict occurs more often in
chemical than in non-chemical disasters. There are frequent disagree-
ments about approach, both among local organizations responding to the
crisis and between community and non-community groups (private firms,
state and federal agencies). Such conflicts result from differing de-
grees of expertise with hazardous chemicals, differing responsibilities
and mandates, and differing perceptions of the crisis.
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The Ohio State researchers found that preparedness improved emergency
time response, coordination, and effectiveness of action. The prepara-
tory thinking, discussion, drills and contacts facilitate more effective
action. In fact, the studies found that preparedness often prevents mi-
nor incidents from escalating into serious catastrophes.
From this perspective the Portland metropolitan area appears well
ahead of most metropolitan areas in its readiness to respond to hazardous
materials disasters. Much of the credit for this belongs to the Hazard-
ous Materials Management Project of Multnomah County, follow-up activi-
ties by the City, and a well-organized Emergency Medical Services opera-
tion. As the City and County work to further strengthen their ability to
respond, and as other local jurisdictions become aware of what these ju-
risdictions are doing, readiness should be improved further.
There are, however, ways that the metropolitan area's readiness can
be improved. Some of these are recognized and are currently being ad-
dressed; others are not.
a^ Regional Planning and Response
There is a need to strengthen the capacity of each jurisdiction to
respond to chemical accidents. There is also a parallel need for a re-
gional response capability.
Multnomah County has a $75,000 van that transports special equipment
and protective clothing to the scene of an incident, and that serves both
as a communications center and disaster command post. Your Committee
questions whether another local government in the metropolitan area can
justify duplicating that investment. Yet the Multnomah County vehicle is
stationed in East County, far from all the "key hazard areas" and all but
one of the "key hazard routes" identified in the County's study.
Other special equipment may be needed, and special training is defi-
nitely needed, before an adequate level of preparedness is reached. But
your Committee feels that better organization and planning for use of the
equipment and expertise already available in the region is even more ur-
gent. The geographic boundaries of local cities and counties are too ar-
bitrary, the differences between resources of small and large jurisdic-
tions are too great, and the need for economic use of limited resources
is too compelling to permit a "go-it-alone" strategy of disaster response.
Many small cities in the metropolitan area, some with "key hazard
routes" running through them, are served by small and even volunteer fire
departments and are without resources of their own to respond to major
hazardous chemical incidents or a chemical disaster. The Ohio State
Disaster Research Center found that most smaller communities are least
prepared for disasters and can locally mobilize the fewest resources (17).
This gives rise to two important questions. How can adequate protec-
tion be provided to all jurisdictions in the metropolitan area? How can
we balance the need to be prepared for chemical disasters against a large
number of other potential disasters that are each unlikely but possible;
how much of its limited resources should a city or county commit to pre-
paration for chemical disasters, earthquakes, storms, floods, volcanic
eruptions, nuclear attack, or other possible disasters?
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Local governments can proceed, as they have thus far, working as in-
dividual jurisdictions, encouraging communications and cooperation when-
ever possible but with no framework for coordination. Your Committee,
however, sees a need to pull together resources and to set priorities for
the entire area.
Your Committee considered the desirability of establishing an umbrel-
la disaster response plan for the metropolitan area, using the special
equipment and expertise now in the area, and filling gaps without dupli-
cating expensive resources.
Local elected officials, fire departments, police departments and
emergency health care agencies could each designate representatives to
develop a plan for coordinated investment and action. These could act
with local transportation and chemical companies, and with private emer-
gency organizations like the Red Cross to set up a system for classifying
the severity of chemical actions and to define the appropriate response
for each. A plan, which could be formally adopted by local City Councils
and County Commissions, could indicate criteria for deciding which inci-
dents can be handled by the local jurisdictions, which will require re-
gional action, and which need an all-out response involving local, state
and federal cooperation. The Puget Sound Study (14) saw a similar need
for regional action and proposed a multi-tiered response capability in
that area.
If such a course of action is followed, first priority should be
given to getting equipment and training that would be useful in a number
of potential disaster situations. Evacuation planning and accommodation
of evacuees should be near the top of the list.
One witness, asked his opinion about such a regional effort, ex-
pressed concern that a jurisdiction with specialized equipment might keep
the equipment for a minor local incident rather than make it available
for a simultaneous major incident in another part of the region. Your
Committee feels that a well designed regional plan adopted by all juris-
dictions in the area could set clear procedures and priorities, and not
depend upon on-the-spot decisions for resource allocation.
There are many kinds of disasters, each unlikely and each requiring
expensive equipment and training for complete preparation. Rather than
duplicating resources within the area, jurisdictions must give priority
to regional capabilities and needs.
Equipment and training that can be useful in a wide range of disas-
trous circumstances should be given priority to those useful for a single
type of disaster. For example evacuation readiness, an important strate-
gy for floods, earthquakes, and nuclear accidents as well as for chemical
disasters, should probably be a higher priority than specialized equip-
ment that is useful only for chemical accidents.
In any event, your Committee senses that thorough training for fire-
fighters who will be responsible for responding to chemical emergencies
may be, for most metropolitan jurisdictions, a greater need than special-
ized equipment. This would be especially true if a regional plan were
adopted formalizing procedures for making Multnomah County's equipment
available elsewhere in the region.
296 CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND BULLETIN
It should be noted that your Committee is not the first to be con-
cerned with this issue. In 1979 the City Club adopted a report recom-
mending adoption of a disaster response plan for the Portland metroplitan
area (19).
b^ Simulated Evacuation Exercises
In the previous section evacuation readiness was cited as being im-
portant for chemical disasters, as well as for other types of disasters.
While many local jurisdictions have written evacuation plans, your Com-
mittee has seen no evidence that many plans have had even a single test
through simulation. The Ohio State University research finds that such
exercises are effective in identifying and resolving potential problems,
especially when the disaster extends beyond the borders of a single ju-
risdiction.
c. Selecting Routes for Transportation of Hazardous Materials
The U.S. Department of Transportation has published guidelines for
local governments to use in selecting preferred routes for transportation
of hazardous materials in order to minimize public exposure to risk of
chemical accidents. Local officials can designate routes that pass
through areas of lower population density, that avoid intersections with
higher accident rates, and that move over railroad tracks using over-
passes rather than ground level crossings.
In its Hazardous Materials Hazard Analysis (15) the City of Portland
indicates its intention to identify preferred routes for shipment of haz-
ardous materials.
ck_ Lack of Information about Hazardous Materials Incidents
in Other Areas
In closing, your Committee is moved to comment on the difficulty in
getting reliable information about hazardous materials incidents and the
actions taken by other local governments in response to chemical disas-
ters. None of the many federal agencies involved in the transportation
of hazardous chemicals has provided a clearinghouse function that would
help local communities learn from each other's experience.
This lack of information is not a serious problem for major cities
and counties. They can assign professional staff full time to get all
necessary data. Smaller communities may have difficulty getting the
basic facts they need to take timely action.
Training programs, like those offered by Multnomah County and the
railroads, are very helpful and meet part of this need. But more infor-
mation could be made available nationally by compiling brief 1- or 2-
page "case studies" describing hazardous materials incidents and their
impacts, and listing actions taken as a result of the experience. Such
summaries would be useful to local governments in designing or evaluating
their own readiness programs.
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Your Committee considered whether this function should be provided by
the federal government or by a private sector entity. In view of the
difficulty experienced in obtaining useful information from U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation channels and the clear and concise information
available from private sources, such as CHEMTREC, your Committee feels
industry groups can better provide such information.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the considerations presented and discussed above, your Com-
mittee has reached the following conclusions:
1) Compared to other risks faced by Portland metropolitan area resi-
dents, the risk of injury or death from a hazardous materials acci-
dent is very low. However, in view of the severity of the worst
chemical disasters, careful attention should be given a program of
prevention and emergency response.
2) At present and for the immediate future, the danger to public safety
from transportation of radioactive materials and chemical wastes
appears far lower than the risk from more common commodities, such as
gasoline, liquefied petroleum gas, anhydrous ammonia or chlorine, for
example.
3) Private firms and industry organizations have established several
programs to improve public protection from hazardous materials acci-
dents. Examples include emergency telephone information on the pro-
perties of dangerous chemicals and training programs for public
safety agency personnel. Such programs appear cost effective for
both the public and industry, and reduce the need for government reg-
ulatory action.
4) Existing laws and regulations that govern the transportation of haz-
ardous materials appear, for the most part, adequate for public pro-
tection. Federal and state regulators appear to have been sensitive
to need for improvements, and have acted promptly as the need for
change has become apparent.
5) Transportation deregulation does not appear to weaken regulatory
rules designed to protect the public from chemical transportation
hazards.
6) There is an obvious and serious gap between the high standards for
public protection stated in chemical transportation regulations and
the actual enforcement actions taken. In a word, enforcement is in-
adequate, especially enforcement of trucking regulations.
7) There likewise appears to be a gap between the high maximum fines
provided by law for violations and the fines actually imposed, though
the inadequate information available did not permit confirmation of
this impression. Stiffer fines for negligence could prove effective
in improving industry compliance with safety regulations.
8) Better organization of existing information about fines levied by
courts for violations of hazardous materials transportation laws and
regulations would be useful to industry officials, regulators, legis-
lators and enforcement officials.
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9) No mechanism currently exists to assure that truck drivers receive
adequate training in the physical and chemical properties of hazard-
ous materials and in emergency procedures when spills occur.
10) Multnomah County and City of Portland officials appear aware of the
problem of chemical transportation disasters and are taking effective
steps to protect the public. Other jurisdictions should review these
actions and consider actions appropriate for their public safety
agencies.
11) The Portland metropolitan area lacks a formal program to respond to
disasters on a coordinated regional basis. There are many trained
individuals and resources scattered among localities, agencies and
firms, but there is no regional structure or plan for organized and
concerted action.
12) Nationally, there is a lack of a central source of information about
chemical disasters and actions that local governments have taken in
response to those that have occurred. Such a resource would be
especially useful to small cities and counties.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the information your Committee has gathered and considered,
the following actions would help protect the public from hazardous chemi-
cal accidents:
1) State of Oregon laws and enforcement programs should be revised to
eliminate any distinction between the transportation of hazardous
wastes and of other categories of hazardous materials. Regulation
should be based on the physical and chemical properties of a materi-
al, not on its history or intended use.
2) Court administrators should better organize information relating to
fines that have been levied for hazardous materials transportation
violations. Such organization would make the information more acces-
sible and more comprehensible than is now the case.
3) The Oregon legislature should enact "Good Samaritan" legislation for
firms with expertise and special equipment to contain or clean up
chemical spills. A firm that is not responsible for causing a haz-
ardous chemical accident and that voluntarily assists in the response
effort, under the direction of public safety officials, should not
become liable for damages resulting from the assistance it provides.
4) More staffing is needed for hazardous materials regulation enforce-
ment in the metropolitan area, especially for enforcement of trucking
safety regulations. Both state and local staffing should be ex-
panded for this purpose. A doubling or tripling of existing enforce-
ment levels can be provided at very moderate cost.
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5) City, county and fire district officials in the Portland metropolitan
area should jointly develop and adopt a regional program for disaster
response.
6) While a need exists for equipment and personnel training useful ex-
clusively for chemical disaster response, highest priority should be
given equipment and training that will be useful for a wide range of
possible disasters. Evacuation readiness is an example of such pre-
paredness, and should be strengthened throughout the region.
7) Over the next few years, local jurisdictions should simulate major
hazardous chemical spill incidents in order to improve readiness.
These simulations should include (1) incidents requiring concerted
action by several local jurisdictions, (2) incidents requiring evacu-
ation of residents in an area, (3) incidents occurring in the vicini-
ty of a major concentration of people, such as near the Memorial
Coliseum, and (4) two incidents occurring simultaneously in different
metropolitan jurisdictions.
8) The City of Portland should implement its plan to set routes for in-
dustrial shipments of hazardous materials, and other jurisdictions
should evaluate the appropriateness of such an action in their area.
9) State and local governments should monitor and encourage private sec-
tor initiatives to improve public protection from hazardous materials
accidents.
10) Chemical and transportation industry firms and trade associations
should expand and strengthen their existing programs for preventing
and responding to chemical transportation accidents. Specific ac-
tions that are needed include:
Continuation and expansion of the existing programs by railroads
to train railroad crews, local fire fighting personnel, and
other emergency service workers.
Quick implementation of the truck driver certification proposed
by the Oregon Trucking Associations and expansion of the program
to provide certification for hazardous cargos.
Establishment of an information center providing case histories
of local chemical disasters and actions taken in response, to
improve the materials available for training emergency response
personnel, particularly from smaller jurisdictions.
Participation in regional disaster planning, including preparing
an inventory of chemical emergency response equipment and exper-
tise available in the region from private sources.
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11) The cost of a higher level of safety enforcement and better personnel
training should be borne by chemical manufacturers and transporters
through business licenses and fines for violations. These costs can
be passed on to the consumers of products that use hazardous chemi-
cals in their manufacture.
Respectfully submitted,
Albert P. Benkendorf
Muriel J. Bussman, R.N.
Gary I. Grenley
Lynette Mannion
Richard E. Roy
Clinton B. Sayler, M.D.
Juli Ann Stream
Roger Eiss, Chairman
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APPENDIX A
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David Astle, Assistant Commissioner, Rail-Air Program, Office of the
Oregon Public Utility Commissioner
Jeff S. Asay, General Attorney, Union Pacific Railroad
Mike Ballan, Budget Analyst, Multnomah County
Dr. Jack Battallia, former Chairman, Committee for Medical Emergency
Services, Multnomah County Medical Society
Xerpha Borunda, formerly Department of Environmental Services, Multnomah
County
Al Carr, former Director, Emergency Medical Services, Multnomah County
Jane Cease, Chair, Transportation Committee, Oregon State House of
Representatives
Charles Davis, Controller, Electro Scientific Industries, Inc., former
Oregon Public Utility Commissioner
R. A. Davis, Division Chief Dispatcher, Union Pacific Railroad
Carroll Fuller, Personnel and Safety Director, Widing Transportation, Inc.
Dr. Gary Gates, Director of Nuclear Medicine, Good Samaritan Hosptial
Paul Graham, Assistant Attorney General, Oregon Department of Justice
Paul R. Henry, Supervisor of Safety, Motor Carrier Program, Office of
Oregon Public Utility Commission
Lea Jenny, formerly Task Force Administrator, Interim Committee on
Transportation, Oregon State Senate
Carol Kelsey, Staff Director, Transportation Committee, Oregon State
House of Representatives
James Klum, Assistant Chief, Portland Fire Bureau
George Kraus, Northwest Public Relations Manager, Sourthern Pacific
Transportation Company
Myra Lee, Office of Emergency Management, Multnomah County
Ken A. Malmquist, Hazadous Materials Specialist, Multnomah County Fire
District 10
Dr. Don McNeil, Chief, Emergency Room Services, Good Samaritan Hospital
Michael A. Meredith, Manager, Oregon Trucking Associations, Inc.
Ross Neely, Officer, Portland Police Bureau, Traffic Division
Frank Ostrander, Assistant Attorney General, Oregon Department of Justice
Richard Reiter, Hazardous Wastes Specialist, Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality
B. C. Reynolds, Hazardous Materials Officer, Multnomah County Division of
Public Safety
Jim Rice, Engine Officer and Lieutenant, Engine 4, Portland Fire Bureau
Bob Robison, Planner, City of Portland Office of Emergency Services
Penny Roe, Hazardous Materials Grant Coordinator, Office of Emergency
Management, Multnomah County
Ruth Shoepe, Coordinator, Emergency Planning, Washington County
David Wade, District Court Administrator's Office, Multnomah County
Dean L. Whitely, Special Agent, Union Pacific Railroad
Lewis Wiedewitsch, Plant Chemist, Pennwalt Corporation
John Williams, Superintendent, Oregon State Police
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